xssmaze v0.3.0

XSSMaze is an intentionally vulnerable web application for measuring and improving XSS detection in security testing tools. It serves 1000+ endpoints across 170+ categories — reflected, DOM, stored, and header/path/body injection, plus filter and WAF bypasses, CSP gadgets, prototype pollution, template injection, and modern DOM sink/source shapes that defeat naive taint analysis.

Every endpoint ships structured metadata, so a benchmark can score per vulnerability class instead of regex-guessing at the served HTML.

[!WARNING] This app is deliberately vulnerable. It binds to 127.0.0.1 by default — only pass -b 0.0.0.0 on a network you trust.

Install

docker run -p 3000:3000 ghcr.io/hahwul/xssmaze:main

Or from source:

shards install && shards build
./bin/xssmaze

Usage

./bin/xssmaze [options]

  -b, --bind HOST          address to bind             127.0.0.1
  -p, --port PORT          port to listen on           3000
  -s, --ssl                serve over HTTPS
      --ssl-key-file FILE  private key, PEM encoded
      --ssl-cert-file FILE certificate, PEM encoded

  -q, --quiet              do not log requests
      --no-banner          start without the banner
      --no-color           disable ANSI colour

  -v, --version            print the version and exit
  -h, --help               print this help and exit

Colour is dropped automatically when the output is not a terminal, and NO_COLOR is honoured.

Endpoint map

| Endpoint | Returns | |----------|---------| | /map/text | newline-separated URLs | | /map/json | full metadata; filter with ?type=, ?q=, ?vuln=, ?reach=, ?exploitable= | | /map/markdown | markdown table | | /map/categories | categories with counts + class/reach rollups | | /map/openapi | OpenAPI 3.0 catalog | | /sitemap.xml | sitemap of all maze paths | | /stats | aggregate counts by class, reach, source, and sink | | /health | liveness probe (/healthz alias) | | /version | version + counts | | /random | 302 to a random maze |

curl "http://localhost:3000/map/json?vuln=dom"           # only DOM flows
curl "http://localhost:3000/map/json?reach=server"       # payload fits in an HTTP request
curl "http://localhost:3000/map/json?exploitable=false"  # deliberate true negatives

The index page (/) has a client-side filter and links to every map above. Map responses are built once at startup, cached, and gzip pre-compressed (Accept-Encoding: gzip cuts the index by ~85%), so they are safe to poll from tooling.

Vulnerability metadata

Every endpoint in /map/json carries a vuln object:

{
  "name": "dom-level7",
  "url": "/dom/level7/",
  "params": ["#hash"],
  "vuln": {
    "class": "dom",
    "reach": "client",
    "delivery": ["fragment"],
    "sources": ["location.hash"],
    "sinks": ["innerHTML"],
    "exploitable": true,
    "note": null
  }
}

| Field | Meaning | |-------|---------| | class | reflected-html, reflected-attr, reflected-js, dom, stored, prototype-pollution, csti, non-xss-control, or unclassified | | sources / sinks | DOM taint endpoints, e.g. location.hash → innerHTML | | delivery | where the payload enters: query, path, body, header, cookie, referer, fragment, postmessage, window-name, … | | reach | derived — server if any delivery channel fits an HTTP request, client if the payload only exists browser-side, unknown if untriaged | | exploitable | false marks a deliberate control / true negative | | note | caveats: required interaction, why it is a control, non-obvious parameter names |

Classification follows the injection context — where the bytes land — not what the receiving API does with a well-formed argument. A value reflected raw into a JS string literal is reflected-js however inert the function it is passed to.

Two things this exists to stop a benchmark getting wrong:

reach: "client" endpoints (fragment, postMessage, window.name, clipboard, drag-and-drop) cannot be reached by a request-only scanner at all. Counting them as misses measures the wrong thing.
exploitable: false endpoints are not bugs. The whole xsleak category is cross-site leaks, not XSS — a scanner that reports nothing there is correct.

Untriaged endpoints are "unclassified" with reach: "unknown", deliberately distinct from "reviewed and found safe".

Security header overrides

To calibrate scanners against different defensive configurations, any endpoint accepts per-request header overrides via query params:

| Param | Sets | |-------|------| | set_csp | Content-Security-Policy (URL-encode spaces/quotes) | | set_xcto | X-Content-Type-Options (e.g. nosniff) | | set_xfo | X-Frame-Options (e.g. DENY) |

curl -i "http://localhost:3000/basic/level1/?query=a&set_csp=default-src%20%27self%27"

XS-Leaks

xsleak-* levels are cross-origin side-channels that vary response size, subresource count, load/error behavior, timing, and redirect depth by a "secret" state. State comes from either q=admin or the xsleak_role=admin cookie (set via GET /xsleak/login?as=admin).

| Level | Endpoint | Oracle | |-------|----------|--------| | 1 | /xsleak/search?q=admin | body size (admin returns more results) | | 2 | /xsleak/frame?q=admin | frame count | | 3 | /xsleak/avatar.gif?q=admin | load/error (admin 200, guest 404) | | 4 | /xsleak/timing?q=admin | timing (guest path sleeps longer) | | 5 | /xsleak/redirect?q=admin | redirect-chain depth |

These are leaks, not XSS — they are marked exploitable: false and a scanner reporting nothing here is behaving correctly. Spot the difference from the CLI:

curl -s "http://localhost:3000/xsleak/frame?q=guest" | wc -c
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/xsleak/frame?q=admin" | wc -c
curl -sL -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}\n" "http://localhost:3000/xsleak/timing?q=admin"

To measure them properly, host a page on a different origin and probe with load/error handlers, timing, and iframe.contentWindow.length.

Benchmarking scanners

scripts/benchmark.py pulls every endpoint from /map/json, runs a scanner against them, and prints a detection scorecard.

./bin/xssmaze -b 0.0.0.0          # terminal 1
cd scripts && ./benchmark.sh http://localhost:3000   # terminal 2

Nuclei is supported out of the box; any other tool can be wired in with --custom-scanner "mytool {URL}". See scripts/README.md for options, report formats, and how to add a scanner permanently.

License

MIT

CrystalDoc.info

xssmaze